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Politicians and tax bureaucrats are viscerally hostile to jurisdictions that offer re-
fuge for the world‘s over-burdened taxpayers. Laws often are enacted to hinder 
economic transactions with these so-called tax havens, but these national efforts 
are just the tip of the iceberg. High-tax nations also have enlisted international 
bureaucracies such as the European Commission,1 the United Nations,2 and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development3 in a coordinated at-
tack on low-tax jurisdictions. Tax havens, we are told, are illegitimate lairs for tax 
evasion and money laundering.
This campaign against low-tax jurisdictions is fundamentally misguided. Tax 
havens (to use the pejorative term coined by proponents of big government) have 
a valuable role in the global economy. They provide a low-tax platform for eco-
nomic activity. They facilitate the efﬁcient allocation of capital. They encourage 
the accumulation of capital. And, because of tax competition, they encourage 
better tax law in the rest of the world. As noted in the New England Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, „Tax competition serves a...beneﬁcial role. It 
forces greater ﬁscal responsibility and affords taxpayers the ability to enjoy more 
of what they earn. This in turn draws savings, investment, and skilled labor into 
the economy.“4
But economic efﬁciency is not the only reason that tax havens should be 
preserved. These low-tax jurisdictions also should be defended on a moral basis. 
Most notably, they encourage policies that promote economic well-being and 
they offer a safe haven for people subject to persecution. The main accusations 
leveled against tax havens, by contrast, are based on bad methodology or inac-
curate information.
1 The European Commission is a Brussels-based bureaucracy representing the 25-member Euro-
pean Community. A description of the European Union‘s „Savings Tax Directive“ can be found 
at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l31050.htm. 
2  The United Nations is based in New York and professes to represent the entire world. The UN‘s 
proposal can be found at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-1000.pdf.
3  The OECD is a Paris-based bureaucracy representing 30 industrialized nations. Most of its 
members are high-tax European nations. The OECD‘s report, „Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue,“ can be found at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf. 
4  Phillip O. Figura, „European Union Tax Rate Harmony: An Unattainable and Detrimental Goal,“ 
New England Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 8:1, 2002. Available at http://
www.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol8/taxrate_v8n1.pdf. 
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Promoting Economic Growth
The ﬁrst responsibility of any government is to protect the safety of its citizens, 
either from external aggression or domestic crime. The second responsibility is to 
provide an environment conducive to economic growth and opportunity. There 
are several steps needed to create that environment, including property rights, 
the rule-of-law, and a stable currency. One of the main conditions for prosperi-
ty, though, is a tax system that rewards – or at least does not unduly discourage 
– productive behavior. Though not normally discussed in moral terms, economic 
growth should be seen as an ethical obligation for government. Failure to pur-
sue good policy deprives people of opportunity and creates hardship for the most 
vulnerable members of society.
Indeed, Benjamin Friedman‘s new book, The Moral Consequences of Economic 
Growth, is dedicated to this thesis. An economist at Harvard, Friedman is a „De-
mocratic partisan“ who has condemned Ronald Reagan‘s economic policy,5 but 
he does recognize that economic growth has numerous positive side effects (or 
externalities, as economists say). In his book, he notes that, „Economic growth-
meaning a rising standard of living for the clear majority of citizens-more often 
than not fosters greater opportunity, tolerance of diversity, social mobility, com-
mitment to fairness, and dedication to democracy.“6
So what does this have to do with tax havens? The answer is that low-tax 
jurisdictions help create – thanks to jurisdictional competition – the environment 
that leads to economic growth. And since economic growth has numerous posi-
tive externalities, tax havens play a valuable role in moving society in the right 
direction.
More speciﬁcally, the ideal tax system should have the lowest possible tax ra-
tes on work, saving, investment, risk-taking, and entrepreneurship. After all, these 
are the activities that generate income and wealth – and thus the behaviors that 
create a prosperous economy. The benchmark for the ideal tax system should be a 
low-rate, consumption-base, territorial system such as the Hall/Rabushka ﬂat tax.7 
The ﬂat tax has a single low rate, all forms of double-taxation are repealed (which 
makes it a „consumption-base“ tax), and there is no tax on income that is earned 
- and subject to tax - in other countries (which makes it a „territorial“ tax). 
Unfortunately, tax rates in most nations are far too high. To make matters 
worse, it also is common for nations to impose extra layers of tax on income that 
is saved and invested, and this compounds the damage of high tax rates. Capital 
gains taxes, double-taxes on dividends, taxes on interest, wealth taxes, depreciation 
taxes (resulting from the failure to allow businesses to expense new investments), 
and death taxes are all examples of ways that governments tilt the playing ﬁeld 
toward immediate consumption at the expense of saving and investment.
These choices have severe negative consequences. Ironically, politicians seem 
to understand the economic impact of high tax rates when tobacco taxes are on 
the agenda. They deliberately impose high tax rates because they want to dis-
courage tobacco consumption. Whether or not this is the appropriate role of go-
vernment, the economic analysis is correct. High tax rates affect behavior, leading 
to less of whatever is being taxed. Yet for some reason, politicians conveniently 
forget this elementary economic insight when considering how to tax income 
and capital formation.
Pervasive double-taxation of saving and investment is particularly perverse 
since all economic theories - including socialism and Marxism - agree that ca-
pital formation is the key to long-run growth and higher living standards. This 
is conﬁrmed by scholarly research. In a November 2002 article in Tax Notes re-
viewing the academic literature, two economists from the American Enterprise 
Institute noted:
... high rates of taxation on capital income...stand in marked contrast to the 
implications of optimal tax theory in the economics literature. Over the past 
three decades, numerous studies...have concluded that an optimal tax system 
in most cases will not include a tax on capital. ...A capital tax introduces a dis-
tortion into an economy, a distortion that „explodes“ over time. Hence, even a 
small capital tax will not be optimal. When capital accumulation and economic 
growth suffer, it is not just high-income individuals that pay the price. ...workers 
are better off - their wages are higher - when the capital stock is higher, which 
makes workers more productive and feeds through to wages.8
Put in simpler terms, high taxes on saving and investment (capital) are akin 
to eating the seed corn of economic growth. Dividend taxes, interest taxes, capi-
tal gains taxes, and death taxes are all levies that punish people for saving and 
5  Dan Seligman, „Good and Plenty,“ Commentary, December 2005. Available at http://www.
commentarymagazine.com/article.asp?aid=12005080_1. 
6  Benjamin M. Friedman, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Knopf, 2005. Available 
at http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0679448918/104-9903662-7619928?v=glance&n=28
3155&n=507846&s=books&v=glance. 
7  Available at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/books/ﬂattax.html 
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investing – particularly since there are no extra layers of federal tax imposed on 
consumption. The ﬂat tax, by contrast, represents an „optimal tax“ since income 
is taxed only one time.  
Unfortunately, politicians apparently believe that it is politically expedient to 
impose high tax rates and impose additional layers of tax on income that is saved 
and invested. For much of the post-World War II era, advocates of pro-growth 
tax reforms were unable to overcome these challenges – which is why nations 
routinely imposed extra layers of tax on saving and investment and generally had 
top tax rates averaging about 70 percent.  
That was the bad news. The good news is that globalization has made it much 
easier for productive resources to cross national borders, and this has led to a 
process know as „tax competition.“ Politicians now face pressure to lower tax 
rates and reform tax regimes to keep the „geese that lay the golden eggs“ from 
ﬂying to greener pastures. As a senior International Monetary Fund ofﬁcial wro-
te, „Today, individuals may be able to choose among many countries in deciding 
where to work, to shop, to invest their ﬁnancial capital, to allocate the produc-
tion activities of the enterprises they control and so on. In these decisions, they 
take into account the impact of taxes, especially as long as the tax systems of 
different countries diverge as much as they do today.“9 Tax havens play a critical 
role in this process. In a new back on international taxation, Richard Teather of 
Bournemouth University explains, „The havens make international capital markets 
more efﬁcient and in many cases make international pooling of capital possible... 
By increasing the efﬁciency of global capital markets, and ensuring that funds 
can ﬂow to the most appropriate investments, tax havens therefore increase the 
efﬁciency of the allocation of capital and, in turn, increase the global standard 
of living. In this way the tax havens beneﬁt us all, whether or not we personally 
invest through them.“10
As the accompanying chart illustrates, tax competition has led to a dramatic 
reduction in income tax rates. Triggered by the Thatcher and Reagan tax rate 
reductions, top tax rates in OECD countries have dropped by an average of 22 
percentage points. The same process is forcing politicians to lower the corpora-
te tax rate, with the tax rate in OECD nations falling by an average of nearly 20 
percentage points.11 As Teather explained, the „need to be competitive internati-
onally in the face of tax competition, forced governments to adopt more interna-
tionally competitive taxation systems and hence more efﬁcient and streamlined 
government operations. The era of free international capital markets and the in-
creased tax competition that these allowed led to the public ﬁnance reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s.“12 The key point to remember, of course, is that lower tax 
rates mean better economic policy. As the American Enterprise Institute econo-
mists explained, „Tax competition has led to sharply lower corporate tax rates ... 
Because fundamental tax reform ideas that have grown out of the optimal tax 
literature often suggest replacing the income tax with a consumption tax, one 
8  Eric Engen and Kevin Hassett, „Does the Corporate Tax Have a Future?“ Tax Notes, November 
8, 2002, at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20021222_raengehass0212.pdf. 
9 Vito Tanzi, „Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Future of Tax Systems,“ International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 96/141, December 1996.
10 Richard Teather, The Beneﬁts of Tax Competition, Institute for Economic Affairs, London, 
2005.
11  Chris Edwards and Veronique de Rugy, „International Tax Competition: A 21st-Century Restraint 
on Government,“ Policy Analysis 431, The Cato Institute, April 12, 2002. Available at http://www.
cato.org/pubs/pas/pa431.pdf. 
12 Richard Teather, The Beneﬁts of Tax Competition, Institute for Economic Affairs, London, 
2005.
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can state that tax competition has pushed national tax systems in the direction 
of an optimal tax.“13
As discussed earlier, lower tax rates are very important for economic growth, 
but it is equally important to reduce and/or eliminate the double-taxation of in-
come that is saved and invested. Since much of this double-taxation is imposed 
on individuals, governments will be encouraged to ﬁx the problem only if indivi-
duals (the „geese“) can shift their saving and investment (the „golden eggs“) to 
other jurisdictions with better tax law. This is why tax havens play a key role in 
the battle for better tax policy. These jurisdictions generally have laws protecting 
the privacy of savers and investors, a practice that makes it much more difﬁcult 
for high-tax governments to track – and tax – ﬂight capital. 
Indeed, the existence of tax havens has compelled governments to reduce the 
tax burden on dividends, interest, capital gains, and other forms of capital income. 
Many Scandinavian nations, for instance, have implemented ﬂat rate taxes on 
capital income – and these tax rates are lower than other tax rates.14 The politi-
cians apparently understand that it is better to collect some tax revenue at a low 
rate rather than no tax revenue at a high rate.15 Many European nations also are 
reducing or eliminating death taxes and wealth taxes. Again, the motive is clear. 
The politicians recognize that punitive tax rates merely encourage oppressed tax-
payers to put their money in places such as Zurich, Luxembourg, New York City, 
or Singapore. As a German economist noted:
The level of total taxation would indeed be higher in a world without tax com-
petition... Financial assets such as bank accounts, bonds, or equity are highly 
mobile and easy to relocate. This often allows taxpayers to reduce their tax bill 
by simply moving their assets across the border. ...Tax competition has largely 
prevented governments from tapping into this revenue source. ...many coun-
tries have lowered their tax claims on resident ﬁnancial income. Top marginal 
income tax rates were cut practically everywhere, and some countries even 
decided to exempt ﬁnancial income completely from the global income tax. 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland turned to so-called dual income tax systems, in 
which capital income is taxed at low proportional rates.16
To reiterate, tax havens promote good tax policy and this leads to faster 
growth. Faster growth, meanwhile, means higher living standards. This is – or at 
least should be – a moral issue since nations with better economic performance 
score better on a wide range of measures. They enjoy better health outcomes. 
They create more jobs, particularly for the less fortunate. Just consider the case 
of Ireland. Thanks to sweeping tax rate reductions and cutbacks in the size of 
government, Ireland has boomed. Living standards increased by 100 percent in 
less than one generation  an astounding consequence. Unemployment dropped 
from 17 percent to 5 percent. No government program has ever come close to 
delivering this kind of result.17
Intellectual Support for Jurisdictional Competition
German and French politicians complained when Ireland cut taxes, and they cer-
tainly are among the leading advocates of tax harmonization. Fortunately, this 
view is not widely shared. Perhaps because of America‘s long experience with 
federalism, many U.S. ofﬁcials are appropriately skeptical of „one-size-ﬁts-all“ 
harmonization schemes. John Bolton, currently serving as America‘s Ambassador 
to the United Nations, wrote that this approach, „... represents a kind of world-
wide cartelization of governments and interest groups. ...The costs to the United 
States--reduced constitutional autonomy, impaired popular sovereignty, reduction 
of our international power, and limitations on our domestic and foreign policy 
options and solutions--are far too great, and the current understanding of these 
costs far too limited to be acceptable.“18 
Not surprisingly, economists are particularly critical of efforts to stiﬂe jurisdic-
tional competition. Indeed, several Nobel Prize winners have commented speciﬁ-
13 Eric Engen and Kevin Hassett, „Does the Corporate Tax Have a Future?“ Tax Notes, November 
8, 2002, at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20021222_raengehass0212.pdf. 
14 Jeffrey Owens, „Fundamental Tax Reform: The Experience of OECD Countries,“ Background 
Paper No. 47, The Tax Foundation, November 2004. Available at http://www.taxfoundation.
org/ﬁles/c3c38b2a0efdaf06d3f5d5a68afc63e9.pdf.
15  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, „Challenges for Tax Policy in 
OECD Countries,“ Economic Outlook, No. 69, 2001. Available at http://www.oecd.org/datao-
ecd/44/0/2086223.pdf. 
16 Philipp Genschel, „Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Viability of the Welfare State,“ 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Working Paper 01/1, May 2001. Available at 
http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp01-1/wp01-1.html#Über3. 
17 For a thorough history of Irish economic reform, see James B. Burnham, „Why Ireland Boomed,“ 
The Independent Review, Vol. VII, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 537-556, at http://www.independent.
org/tii/media/pdf/tir74burnham.pdf.
18  John R. Bolton, „Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?“ Chicago Journal of International 
Law, 2000. 
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cally on tax competition. James Buchanan points out that „...the intergovernmen-
tal competition that a genuinely federal structure offers may be constitutionally 
‚efﬁcient‘...“ and that „...tax competition among separate units...is an objective to 
be sought in its own right.“19 Milton Friedman, meanwhile, writes, „Competition 
among national governments in the public services they provide and in the taxes 
they impose is every bit as productive as competition among individuals or enter-
prises in the goods and services they offer for sale and the prices at which they 
offer them.“20 And Gary Becker observed that „...competition among nations tends 
to produce a race to the top rather than to the bottom by limiting the ability of 
powerful and voracious groups and politicians in each nation to impose their will 
at the expense of the interests of the vast majority of their populations.“21 
Legal scholars also recognize the dangers of harmonization. John McGinnis 
of Northwestern University Law School recently wrote that, „Jurisdictional com-
petition among sovereign nations is a primary mechanism for empowering the 
‚encompassing interest‘ of a nation and reducing the ability of interest groups to 
take resources from the government. Under jurisdictional competition, sovereigns 
compete by providing efﬁcient levels of public goods. Leaders are thereby restrai-
ned from rewarding themselves, their supporters, or inﬂuential special interest 
groups. A large, diverse democracy, where interest groups are held in check by 
jurisdictional competition, substantially reduces the incentives for individuals to 
seek rents through government action. Individuals will instead spend their time, 
on balance, in relatively more productive and peaceful activity.“22 Another Pro-
fessor from Case Western Reserve University Law School echoed these thoughts, 
commenting, „...a world with lots of borders is nonetheless a far friendlier world 
for liberty than one with fewer borders. They promote competition for people 
and money, which tends to restrain the state from grabbing either. Borders offer 
chances to arbitrage regulatory restrictions, making them less effective. Without 
borders these constraints on the growth of the state would vanish.“23
Even Critics Agree
Perhaps the most compelling evidence can be found in the writings of those who 
oppose lower taxes and tax havens. Regarding the link between tax policy and 
economic growth, economists and policy analysts working for leftist think tanks 
now admit that lower tax rates and tax reform improve economic performance. 
To be sure, they will quibble about the size of growth effects and argue that other 
factors – such as deﬁcit spending – also impact economic performance. But their 
acquiescence to the fundamentals of „supply-side“ economics is nonetheless a 
remarkable development.
An Urban Institute paper, for instance, acknowledged that, „lower capital in-
come tax rates reduce the user cost of capital and stimulate investment.“24 And 
in an analysis of the recommendations of the President‘s Tax Reform Panel, eco-
nomists writing for the Tax Policy Center admitted, „The report contains a num-
ber of interesting and important proposals that would generally move the struc-
ture of the tax system in the right direction, with simpler rules, a broader base, 
generally lower effective marginal tax rates, and more consistent treatment of 
different types of income.“25 Perhaps the most interesting admission came from 
a Brookings Institution paper, which acknowledged both the link between lower 
tax rates and growth and the fact that lower tax rates and tax reform improve 
tax compliance: 
The positive effects of tax cuts on growth arise because lower marginal tax 
rates raise the reward to working, saving, and investing. Holding real income 
constant, these lower marginal rates induce more work effort, saving, and in-
vestment through substitution effects. ... Tax cuts or well-designed reforms may 
also reduce the extent to which taxpayers legally avoid and illegally evade taxes. 
This can improve the allocation of resources and hence raise economic growth 
even without increasing the level of labor and capital inputs.26
19  Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan (1980), The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a 
Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge).
20  Letter to Center for Freedom and Prosperity, 2001. Available at http://www.freedomandprosperity.
org/update/u05-15-01/u05-15-01.shtml#3. 
21  Gary Becker, „What‘s Wrong with a Centralized Europe? Plenty,“ Business Week, June 29, 
1998.
22  John O. McGinnis, „The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism,“ Chicago Journal of Inter-
national Law, 2000. 
23  Andrew P. Moriss, „Borders and Liberty,“ The Freeman, Vol. 54. No. 7, July 2004. Available at 
http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=4646. 
24  William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag, „Deﬁcits, Interest Rates, and the User Cost of Capital: A 
Reconsideration of the Effects of Tax Policy on Investment,“ Discussion Paper No. 27, The Urban 
Institute, August 2005. Available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311211_TPC_
DiscussionPaper_27.pdf. 
25  Leonard E. Burman and William G. Gale, „A Preliminary Evaluation of the Tax Reform Panel‘s 
Report,“ Tax Notes, December 5, 2005. Available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/Uploa-
dedPDF/1000854_Tax_Break_12-05-05.pdf.
26  William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag, „Economic Effects of Making the 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts 
Permanent,“ Brookings Institution, August 2004. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/
papers/20040817galeorszag.pdf. 
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Even the OECD has produced some surprisingly honest analysis about the-
se issues. For instance, OECD economists have estimated, „that economies grow 
one-half of 1 percent (0.5 percent) faster for every 10-percentage-point reduction 
in marginal tax rates.“27 Another paper states, „The overall tax burden is found 
to have a negative impact on output per capita. Furthermore, controlling for the 
overall tax burden, there is an additional negative effect coming from an extensive 
reliance of direct taxes. Taxes and government expenditures affect growth both 
directly and indirectly through investment. An increase of about one percentage 
point in the tax pressure ...could be associated with a direct reduction of about 
0.3 per cent in output per capita. If the investment effect is taken into account, 
the overall reduction would be about 0.6-0.7 per cent.“28 They also endorse the 
optimal tax theory discussed above, noting that, „the best way to improve econo-
mic performance would be to replace current wage-income and capital-income 
taxes by a general tax on consumption.“29 
Remarkably, OECD economists even understand that tax competition is a libe-
ralizing force in the world economy. They explicitly have noted that, „the ability 
to choose the location of economic activity offsets shortcomings in government 
budgeting processes, limiting a tendency to spend and tax excessively.“30 Another 
paper admits that, „...decentralisation can make governments more accountab-
le, allowing a better matching of resources to preferences. It may also introdu-
ce competition across jurisdictions and thus raise public sector efﬁciency.“31 The 
head of the Tax Policy and Statistics division of the OECD‘s Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration recently stated that, „The new member states of the EU have 
come in with very low corporate tax rates...and this is clearly putting pressure 
on European countries worrying about business relocating to these lower-tax ju-
risdictions.“32 And another report noted, „...because of taxpayer mobility, states‘ 
ability to levy progressive income taxes is quite limited.“33
Most amazingly, even one of the anti-tax competition reports produced by 
the OECD included language admitting that, „The more open and competitive 
environment of the last decades has had many positive effects on tax systems, 
including the reduction of tax rates and broadening of tax bases which have cha-
racterized tax reforms over the last 15 years. In part these developments can be 
seen as a result of competitive forces that have encouraged countries to make 
their tax systems more attractive to investors. In addition to lowering overall tax 
rates, a competitive environment can promote greater efﬁciency in government 
expenditure programs.“34 Last but not least, it is worth noting that a former Clin-
ton-era Treasury Department ofﬁcial has recognized that tax havens promote 
better tax policy. Commenting on the ability of governments to double-tax ca-
pital when savers and investors can protect their money in low-tax jurisdictions, 
he admitted, „I think it‘s very unlikely that we can continue to impose taxes on 
capital income.“35
These quotes are particularly illuminating, especially since so many of them 
come from the organization that is leading the charge against tax competition. 
While this appears to be a sign of intellectual incoherence, it actually is driven 
by the OECD‘s internal structure. The professional economists generally publish 
good work, as indicated in the previous statements. The Fiscal Affairs Committee, 
by contrast, is comprised of tax collectors from each member nation, and they are 
27  Willi Leibfritz, John Thornton, and Alexandra Bibbee, „Taxation and Economic Performance,“ 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economics Department, Working 
Paper No. 176, 1997. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/25/1863834.pdf. 
28  Andrea Bassanini and Stefano Scarpetta, „The Driving Forces Of Economic Growth: Panel Data 
Evidence For The OECD Countries,“ OECD Economic Studies No. 33, November 2001. Available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/2/18450995.pdf.
29  Willi Leibfritz, John Thornton, and Alexandra Bibbee, „Taxation and Economic Performance,“ 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economics Department, Working 
Paper No. 176, 1997. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/25/1863834.pdf. 
30  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Outlook, June 17, 1998. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/2088806.pdf
31 Isabelle Joumard and Per Mathis Kongsrud, „Fiscal Relations Across Government Le-
vels,“ Economics Department Working Papers No. 375, December 10, 2003. Available 
at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/
b9c6758da58f9c76c1256df80035d70c/$FILE/JT00155695.PDF. 
32 Christopher Heady, „World-wide trends in corporate taxation and tax reform,“ Presentation to Tax 
Foundation Annual Conference, Washington, DC, November 17, 2005. Available at http://www.
taxfoundation.org/2005conference/heady-poschmann/. 
33 Thomas Laubach, „Fiscal Relations Across Levels Of Government In The United States,“ 
Economics Department Working Papers No. 462, Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, November 2005. Available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2005doc.
nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/da360144bb5dbe5ec12570c8005c0cfd/$FILE/
JT00195165.PDF.
34 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, „The OECD‘s project on harmful 
tax practices: the 2001 progress report,“ 2001. Available at http://www.oecd.org/datao-
ecd/60/28/2664438.pdf. 
35 Joseph Guttentag, „Appropriate Responses to International Tax Competition,“ American En-
terprise Institute, December 9, 2003. Available at http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.676,ﬁlter.
all/event_detail.asp#.
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the ones pushing the anti-tax competition agenda.36 The Fiscal Affairs Committee 
of the OECD, for instance, has complained that tax competition is „re-shaping 
the desired level and mix of taxes and public spending.“37 The Committee also has 
admitted that the anti-tax competition „project is about ensuring that the bur-
den of taxation is fairly shared and that tax should not be the dominant factor in 
making capital allocation decisions.“38 And it also has complained that the ability 
to shift economic activity to low-tax jurisdictions „may hamper the application of 
progressive tax rates and the achievement of redistributive goals.“39
The Moral Beneﬁts of Growth
Economic growth leads to higher incomes, but why does that matter? Each suc-
ceeding generation of Americans enjoys living standards about 50 percent higher 
than its parents,40 for instance, but has this added income and wealth made them 
happier? According to researchers, the answer is yes:
According data from surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, for ex-
ample, people in the top ﬁfth of income earners are about 50% more likely to 
say they are „very happy“ than people in the bottom ﬁfth, and only about half 
as likely to say they are „not too happy.“ ...a $1,000 increase in per capita in-
come is associated with a one-point decrease in the percentage of Americans 
saying they are „not too happy.“41
Moreover, there is direct evidence that lower taxes and smaller government 
boost happiness. As the Wall Street Journal commented when discussing the 
National Opinion Research Center ﬁndings, „...a $1,000 increase in government 
revenues per capita is associated with a two-point rise in the percentage of Ame-
ricans saying they are not too happy. In other words, not only can money buy 
happiness, but it may be that the government can tax it away as well.“42 The re-
lationship between happiness and small government is echoed by research from 
a Swiss University:
Our results show that life satisfaction decreases with higher government spen-
ding. ... It is alleviated by government effectiveness - but only in countries where 
the state sector is already small. ...life satisfaction decreases with government‘s 
active involvement in the economy. ...the data on life satisfaction are from the 
third and fourth waves of the World Values Survey... The evidence quite clearly 
supports the public choice view that excessive government involvement is detri-
mental to individuals‘ quality of life. ... We therefore conclude with a rather simple 
policy implication: governments interested in maximizing the life satisfaction of 
their voters should, regardless of their ideology, limit their direct interventions in 
the economy to allow voters a high degree of personal freedom.43
Adam Smith predicted the link between income and happiness more than 
200 years ago. He noted in The Wealth of Nations that, „in the progressive state, 
while the society is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it has 
acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the great body of 
the people seems to be the happiest and the most comfortable. It is hard in the 
stationary, and miserable in the declining state.“44
An economy that performs well generates substantial increases in living stan-
dards. Economists at the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank calculated changes in the 
purchasing power of an average wage. They note that, „In terms of time on the 
job, the cost of a half-gallon of milk fell from 39 minutes in 1919 to 16 minutes 
in 1950, 10 minutes in 1975 and 7 minutes in 1997.“ Likewise, „a typical facto-
ry worker had to toil more than 2 years to buy Ford‘s Model T [in 1908], one of 36 Daniel J. Mitchell, „Paris, Taxes,“ Techcentralstation.com, May 19, 2004. Available at http://
techcentralstation.com/051904A.html. 
37 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, „Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue,“ 1998. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf.
38 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, „Towards Global Tax Co-operation,“ 
2000. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf. 
39 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, „Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue,“ 1998. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf.
40 Dan Seligman, „Good and Plenty,“ Commentary, December 2005. Available at http://www.
commentarymagazine.com/article.asp?aid=12005080_1. 
41 Arthur Brooks, „Money Buys Happiness,“ Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2005. Available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113400764335517001.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep. 
42 Arthur Brooks, „Money Buys Happiness,“ Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2005. Available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113400764335517001.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep. 
43  Christian Bjornskov, Axel Dreher, and Justina A.V. Fischer, „The bigger the better? Evidence of the 
effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world,“ Working Paper 05/44, Institute 
of Economic Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, October 25, 2005. Available 
at http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/ecol-pool/incoll/incoll_1037.pdf. 
44  Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature & Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776.
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the nation‘s ﬁrst affordable cars. A 1997 Ford Taurus costs today‘s worker just 8 
months.“45
Growth also has important implications for the quality of life. People with 
higher income can afford more health care and better health care. They live in 
societies that can afford more medical research. This means new drugs that can 
potentially save lives. Simply stated, wealthier nations are healthier nations.46 But 
even „vanity“ health purchases such as cosmetic surgery, laser eye surgery, and 
orthodontic care are a symbol of the lifestyle improvements found in wealthier 
societies.
Equally important, living standards also have an impact on the length of life. 
The two accompanying charts show the relationship between income and lon-
gevity. The ﬁrst uses today‘s data to demonstrate that people in rich nations live 
much longer than people in poor nations.47 The second uses historical data to 
illustrate the increases in both income and lifespan in the United States during 
the 20th century.48 Correlation is not necessarily causation, of course, but there is 
little doubt that there is a link between lifespan and income.
Economic growth also yields other beneﬁts, particularly with regards to civil 
society. Benjamin Friedman (no relation to Milton) wrote in his new book that, 
„The value of a rising standard of living lies not just in the concrete improvements 
it brings to how individuals live but in how it shapes the social, political and ulti-
mately the moral character of a people.“49 The Economist agreed with Friedman‘s 
hypothesis, writing: 
45  W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, „Time Well Spent: The Declining Real Cost of Living in Ame-
rica,“ Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1997. Available at http://www.dallasfed.
org/fed/annual/1999p/ar97.html. 
46  Daniel J. Mitchell, „The Deadly Impact of Federal Regulations,“ Journal of Regulation and Social 
Cost, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 1992.
47  United Nations, „Human Development Report,“ 2005. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/statis-
tics/data/indicators.cfm?alpha=yes. 
48  U.S. Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-04.html. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial 
Times to 1970. Available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p1-
07.pdf. 
49  Benjamin M. Friedman, The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, Knopf, 2005. Available 
at http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0679448918/104-9903662-7619928?v=glance&n=28
3155&n=507846&s=books&v=glance. 
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„Growing prosperity, history suggests, makes people more tolerant, more willing 
to settle disputes peacefully, more inclined to favour democracy. Stagnation 
and economic decline are associated with intolerance, ethnic strife and dic-
tatorship. ...If people are becoming better off relative to their own past stan-
dard of living, they will care less about where they stand in relation to others. 
If they are not growing better off relative to their own past standard of living, 
they will care more about their placing in relation to others-and the result is 
frustration, intolerance and social friction. Growth, in short, has moral as well 
as material beneﬁts.“50
Economic growth is even linked to a decrease in armed conﬂict, as noted in 
a Fraser Institute study.51 Moreover, a review of Friedman‘s book in the Interna-
tional Herald Tribune explores this link. The article noted the role of growth in 
reducing crisis-level poverty, but also commented on the link between growth, 
democratization, and the decline in armed conﬂict:
Growth, he notes, has already placed mankind on a course toward the eliminati-
on of destitution. Despite the popular misconception of worsening developing-
world misery, the fraction of people in poverty is in steady decline. Thirty years 
ago 20 percent of the planet lived on $1 or less a day; today, even adjusting for 
inﬂation, only 5 percent does, despite a much larger global population. Probably 
one reason democracy is taking hold is that living standards are rising, putting 
men and women in a position to demand liberty. And with democracy sprea-
ding and rising wages giving ever more people a stake in the global economic 
system, it could be expected that war would decline. It has. Even taking Iraq 
into account, a study by the Center for International Development and Conﬂict 
Management, at the University of Maryland, found that the extent and intensity 
of combat in the world is only about half what it was 15 years ago.52
Economic growth is not an elixir. It does not solve all problems, but a more 
prosperous economy certainly makes many problems easier to address. Tax ha-
vens help promote growth by encouraging governments to shift toward optimal 
tax policy. To be sure, tax competition is just one of many factors inﬂuencing 
economic performance. But it unquestionably is a powerful force for economic 
liberalization, and this helps offset the political pressures to expand the size and 
power of government. In other words, tax havens may play just a minor role in 
making the world a better place, but they probably play a bigger role in keeping 
the world from moving in the wrong direction. 
Tax havens do not exist to make the world a better place, of course. The in-
dividuals and companies who utilize tax havens generally are not motivated by 
a desire to improve the world. Unintended consequences can be very powerful, 
however, and tax havens encourage better policy - and better policy has led to 
the positive outcomes described above.
Protecting Human Rights
The economic argument for tax havens is powerful, but there is a similarly compel-
ling case that these jurisdictions play a valuable role in protecting human rights. 
The vast majority of the world‘s population lives in nations that fail to provide the 
basic protections of civilized society. Corruption often is rampant, expropriation 
is common, crime is endemic, and there is widespread persecution of religious, 
political, ethnic, and sexual minorities. 
In such environments, people with money frequently are the targets of op-
pression. But if such people have the ability to place their assets in a jurisdiction 
that protects ﬁnancial privacy, they are much more likely to avoid persecution. 
Likewise, people who live in regimes plagued by political instability or economic 
mismanagement are at great risk of losing all their assets and thus putting their 
families at risk. But if such people have the ability to use tax havens, they are 
much more likely to avoid ﬁnancial calamity. The following examples illustrate 
the value of ﬁnancial privacy:
•  Consider the case of a Venezuelan entrepreneur: Corruption in the nation‘s 
tax ofﬁce creates the possibility that his ﬁnancial proﬁle will be sold to thugs, 
who will kidnap his daughter and cut off her ears or ﬁngers unless the busi-
nessman pays a huge ransom. This is not just a hypothetical threat. A report 
from the United Nations noted that, „People with substantial private wealth 
are targets for criminals of all kinds. In some parts of the world kidnapping has 
50  The Economist, „Why the rich must get richer,“ November 10, 2005. Available at http://www.
economist.com/books/displayStory.cfm?story_id=5135504. 
51  The link between growth and peace is explored in considerable detail in the Fraser Institute‘s 
Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report, available at http://www.fraserinstitute.
org/admin/books/chapterﬁles/EFW2005complete.pdf#. 
52  Gregg Easterbrook, „Economic growth as an engine for social progress,“ The International Herald 
Tribune, November 24, 2005. Available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/23/features/pro-
gress.php. 
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become an industry.“53 The International Trade and Investment Organization 
wrote that, „Afﬂuent taxpayers in at least one major OECD member country 
also fear that tax data is routinely sold to criminal gangs seeking targets for 
kidnapping, common in that state.“54 If bureaucracies such as the OECD and 
EC succeed in destroying ﬁnancial privacy, the consequences could be deadly. 
As the U.N. admitted, „Global sharing of information means that criminal ac-
cess can occur at the weakest point of entry, multiplying the risks associated 
with unauthorized disclosure.“55 This is a pervasive problem. According to the 
World Bank, 113 nations get negative grades on upholding the rule of law and 
117 countries get failing grades on corruption.56 But if tax havens are allowed 
to exist and people can use ﬁnancial privacy to protect legitimate assets, this 
danger posed by these regimes is lessened. In the example of the Venezuelan 
entrepreneur, he reduces the threat to his family if he can put his money in a 
Miami bank, secure in the knowledge that his government will not have access 
to any information.
•  Consider the case of a Congolese merchant: According to Freedom House, she 
lives in an „unfree“ nation.57 The World Bank says her nation does not respect 
the rule of law.58 And Transparency International gives her nation a poor grade 
on corruption.59 In this wretched environment, she makes herself the target 
of a government that routinely seizes private wealth if she accumulates any 
assets. And since the government almost surely controls the judiciary, there is 
no rule-of-law to protect her. This is a common risk around the world. There are 
48 „unfree“ and 54 „partly free“ countries according to Freedom House.60 And 
there are 120 nations that score below a ﬁve on Transparency International‘s 
1-10 corruption scale.61 But if, for example, the Congolese merchant has an 
account in London – unknown to the government – her freedom to provide 
goods and services to the community is less vulnerable. 
•  Consider the case of an Argentine businessman: The ability to have private 
offshore accounts also enables people to protect themselves from ﬁnancial 
instability and expropriation. In the case of Argentina, the government‘s gross 
incompetence has subjected citizens to massive devaluations and ﬁnancial 
instability. This is not unusual in many places around the world, which is why 
testimony before a U.S. Senate committee found, „clients were motivated to 
establish their banking relationships for a variety of reasons, ...includ[ing] 
...avoidance of foreign exchange controls, fear of currency devaluation, fear of 
conﬁscation resulting from political upheaval.“62 According to the World Bank, 
there are 105 nations with negative grades on the issue of regulatory quality.63 
And the Milken Institute found 60 nations with below average grades in its 
Capital Access Index.64 Businessmen from jurisdictions with instability issues 
can protect themselves by using a tax haven, almost all of which receive ex-
cellent grades. For the hypothetical Argentine businessman, an account in the 
Bahamas is an excellent way of protecting his ﬁnancial affairs from a venal, 
corrupt, and incompetent government. 
•  Consider the case of a Middle Eastern Jew: There are still many areas of the 
world where Jews are treated unfairly, particularly in the Middle East. And the 
persecution quite likely is linked to the wealth since bigots are especially likely 
to resent someone who is ﬁnancially successful. Other faiths also are subject 
to persecution, either from other governments dominated by other religions or 
government hostile to any organized religion. According to Open Doors Inter-
national, for example, Christians are oppressed in 13 nations and persecuted in 
31 nations.65 Tax havens provide a refuge for religious minorities. Indeed, the 
famous Swiss laws regarding banking secrecy were signiﬁcantly strengthened 
53  United Nations, „Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy, and Money Laundering,“ Ofﬁce on Drugs 
and Crime, 1998. Available at http://www.imolin.org/imolin/ﬁnhaeng.html. 
54  Towards a Level Playing Field, 2nd Edition, International Tax and Investment Organisation and 
Society for Trust and Estate Practitioners, October 2003. Available at http://www.itio.org/do-
cuments/Towards-A-Level-Playing-Field-Second%20Edition.pdf. 
55  United Nations, „Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy, and Money Laundering,“ Ofﬁce on Drugs 
and Crime, 1998. Available at http://www.imolin.org/imolin/ﬁnhaeng.html. 
56  The World Bank, „Aggregate Governance Indicators,“ 2005.Available at http://www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pdf/2004kkdata.xls.
57 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/table2004.pdf. 
58  The World Bank, „Aggregate Governance Indicators,“ 2005.Available at http://www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pdf/2004kkdata.xls.
59  http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005
60 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/table2004.pdf. 
61  http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2005
62  Testimony of Antonio Giraldi before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, November 10, 1999. Available at http://hsgac.
senate.gov/111099_giraldi.htm. 
63  The World Bank, „Aggregate Governance Indicators,“ 2005.Available at http://www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pdf/2004kkdata.xls.
64  http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/publications.taf?cat=PBriefs&function=detail&ID
=459. 
65  http://sb.od.org/index.php?supp_page=wwl_2005&supp_lang=en
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in 1934 after Adolf Hitler took control in Germany.66 The ability to maintain 
assets in Switzerland still today – unknown to oppressive governments – may 
play a valuable role in helping people ﬁght religious persecution. 
•  Consider the case of a Haitian taxpayer: According to the World Bank, Haiti has 
one of the world‘s least effective governments.67 In the absence of competent 
and honest government, taxpayers are left few options. As one academic noted, 
„There are situations in some developing countries where law-breaking helps 
to survive. If people want to open a business, to acquire land or build homes 
they are confronted with high transaction costs. ...tax evasion can be seen as 
an ‚exit‘ option, a signal through which taxpayers can express their disagree-
ment.“68 For a beleaguered taxpayer, putting assets in an Anguilla company 
– shielded from the view of the kleptocratic Haitian government - may be the 
only rational option.
•  Consider the case of a family in Zimbabwe: According to the World Bank, 
Zimbabwe is among the world‘s most politically unstable regimes.69 Moreover, 
expropriation is a common threat for those who are viewed as enemies by the 
nation‘s dictator. But this problem extends even to OECD nations, as illustrated 
by testimony before the U.S. Senate.70 If the World Bank is the judge of instabi-
lity, Zimbabwe is joined by another 100 unstable nations.71 For people in these 
nations, a Delaware company is an ideal way of protecting family wealth since 
it is almost impossible for foreign governments to obtain information about 
private ﬁnancial holdings.
• Consider the case of a human rights activist in Turkmenistan: Political minorities 
are threatened in the absence of ﬁnancial privacy. In countries controlled by 
dictators - and even in some countries with immature democracies - opposi-
tion party leaders and political dissidents often are targeted for persecution. 
And if the ruling elite is in a position to threaten the personal ﬁnances of its 
opponents, democracy is more likely to wither. In such nations, it is doubtful 
that the media publicize these abuses. According to Freedom House, 119 nations 
- including Turkmenistan – do not enjoy a free press.72 But if political minorities 
can park their assets in Luxembourg, a nation with strong secrecy laws, they 
have a greater ability to ﬁght for liberty.
•  Consider the case of an ethnic Chinese businessman in Indonesia: Tax havens 
are especially important for ethnic minorities. The Chinese often are persecuted 
in places such as Indonesia and the Philippines, for instance, and Indians are 
persecuted in East Africa. Much of this persecution is driven by envy, so it is 
particularly important for the Chinese and the Indians to have ways of maintai-
ning their saving and investment away from the public eye. A bank account 
in Singapore - guarded against outside inquiry - helps protect against ethnic 
attack since bigots are more likely to seek out those with assets to plunder.
•  Consider the case of a homosexual in Saudi Arabia: Sexual minorities still are 
persecuted in many nations. Depending on the country, gays and lesbians face 
challenges ranging from ostracism to criminal prosecution. Indeed, there are 
84 nations with laws that target homosexuals.73 Needless to say, the ability to 
conduct ﬁnancial operations in a place like Liechtenstein – which would refuse 
to cooperate with a government seeking to target sexual minorities – may 
be the only way for homosexuals to guard against an oppressive government 
getting too much information. 
The key link in all these examples is that persecuted people need the freedom 
to move their assets to jurisdictions with adequate privacy laws. These people are 
not primarily motivated by a desire to escape excessive taxation, but they none-
theless beneﬁt from tax havens since ﬁnancial institutions in these jurisdictions 
generally are not obliged by help enforce foreign laws – particularly when those 
foreign governments are trying to investigate and prosecute activities that are 
not illegal in the low-tax jurisdiction. This „dual criminality“ principle is a valu-
able protection for civil liberties around the world.
66  Maurice Aubert, „Swiss Banking Secrecy,“ Schellenberg & Haissly, Geneva, March 1997.
67  The World Bank, „Aggregate Governance Indicators,“ 2005.Available at http://www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pdf/2004kkdata.xls.
68  Benno Torgler, „Tax Morale: Theory and Empirical Analysis of Tax Compliance,“ Dissertation, 
University of Basel, July 11, 2003. Available at http://pages.unibas.ch/diss/2003/DissB_6463.
pdf.
69  The World Bank, „Aggregate Governance Indicators,“ 2005.Available at http://www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pdf/2004kkdata.xls. 
70  Testimony of Amy Elliot before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Commit-
tee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, November 9, 1999. Available at http://hsgac.senate.
gov/110999_elliott.htm. 
71  The World Bank, „Aggregate Governance Indicators,“ 2005.Available at http://www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pdf/2004kkdata.xls.
72 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey/allscore2005.pdf
73  International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission. Available at http://www.iglhrc.
org/site/iglhrc/content.php?type=1&id=77. 
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Tax Havens Get Good Grades on Governance
The leading tax havens are among the world‘s most tolerant and pluralistic ju-
risdictions. They certainly score very well on the World Bank‘s six governance 
indicators. Looking at eight nations and territories that are global leaders in the 
market for offshore services, they rank near the top in some categories and their 
average grades also are among the highest in the world. Of those leading tax ha-
vens, four score higher than the United States and four score lower – and those 
four are just barely behind America. It is also interesting to compare tax havens 
to France, since the French are the leading opponents of tax competition. Seven 
of the eight tax havens rank above France, and the one that is behind – Bermuda 
– trails by just one slot.
Global Governance Rankings
 VA PS GE RQ RL CC       Ranking
Hong Kong 100 19 17 2 21 20 24
Singapore 117 8 2 3 10 2 20
Cayman Islands 61 4 24 40 29 32 26
Switzerland 6 11 1 16 3 7  5
Luxembourg 10 2 5 1 2 8  3
Liechtenstein 17 14 18 10 23 17 12
Bahamas 28 40 27 52 25 25 28
Bermuda 45 33 25 36 33 38 30
United States 22 82 14 27 17 16 21
France 20 75 20 45 24 23 29
VA = voice and accountability, PS = political stability, GE = government effectiveness, RQ = regu-
latory quality, RL = rule of law, CC = control of corruption. Note: Average score does not indicate 
ordinal ranking.
Even Critics Agree
Perhaps the most compelling arguments for ﬁnancial privacy come from the re-
luctant admissions of organizations and individuals who are ﬁghting against tax 
havens. The United Nations bureaucracy opposes tax competition and seeks to 
destroy ﬁnancial privacy, yet the UN Declaration of Human Rights recognizes and 
protects privacy as a basic human right.74 The United Nations even has admitted 
the need for individuals to be protected from oppression. A 1998 report publis-
hed by the U.N. confessed, „Equally serious issues arise when Governments enga-
ge in human rights violations. For much of the twentieth century, Governments 
around the world spied on their citizens to maintain political control. Political 
freedom can depend on the ability to hide purely personal information from a 
Government.“75 
But the United Nations is not the only hypocritical organization. In a sho-
cking development, the leader of the OECD‘s anti-tax competition campaign, 
Jeffrey Owens, recognized the role of tax havens as a bulwark for the protection 
of human rights. As reported by the U.K.-based Observer, „Owens...stressed that 
tax havens are essential for individuals who live in unstable regimes.“76 And a 
former Clinton-era Treasury Department ofﬁcial who was closely involved with 
the OECD‘s anti-tax competition campaign admitted, „How far do we want to go 
with this information exchange, and the secrecy issues, the privacy issues, and so 
forth, which relates to the problems of corrupt governments, of danger to your 
children and to individuals. That subject should be discussed.“77 
The OECD has even acknowledged in publications that, „Bank secrecy has deep 
historical and cultural roots in some countries“ and that, „Bank secrecy is also a 
fundamental requirement of any sound banking system.“78 Yet the OECD – like 
the United Nations – is willing to suspend important human rights safeguards. 
Put bluntly, these bureaucracies put the interests of high-tax governments before 
the safety and liberty of the bulk of the world‘s population.
74  United Nations, „Universal Declaration of Human Rights,“ 1948. Available at http://www.
un.org/Overview/rights.html. 
75  United Nations, „Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy, and Money Laundering,“ Ofﬁce on Drugs 
and Crime, 1998. Available at http://www.imolin.org/imolin/ﬁnhaeng.html. 
76  Nick Mathiason, „Where the rich stash their cash,“ The Observer, March 27, 2005. Available at 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,6903,1446130,00.html. 
77  Joseph Guttentag, „Appropriate Responses to International Tax Competition,“ American En-
terprise Institute, December 9, 2003. Available at http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.676,ﬁlter.
all/event_detail.asp#. 
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Sovereignty as a Moral Issue
The campaign against tax havens interferes with the right of jurisdictions to pursue 
pro-growth policies. This is especially onerous for poor jurisdictions. Having „no 
or low taxes“ is the main criteria for being listed as a tax haven by the OECD.79 
Yet most OECD nations did not have income taxes during the 1800s, which was 
the period of time when they climbed from agricultural poverty to middle class 
prosperity. Why is it wrong for developing nations to follow the same develop-
ment strategy? 
Another issue is the OECD‘s hypocritical treatment of capital compared to 
labor. The Paris-based bureaucracy is upset that capital is ﬂowing to low-tax ju-
risdictions, many of which are in the developing world. But OECD nations are big 
beneﬁciaries of a „brain drain“ from developing nations.80 This ﬂow of talent is 
very beneﬁcial for „labor-inﬂow“ nations, just as global ﬁnancial ﬂows are very 
beneﬁcial for „capital-inﬂow“ nations. Yet the OECD is not suggesting that de-
veloping nations have the right to tax emigrant income earned in OECD nations, 
so why should OECD nations be allowed to tax ﬂight capital in non-OECD nations? 
(The United Nations actually is proposing to give governments in the developing 
world the right to tax emigrant income.81 But this idea has no chance of becoming 
policy because of opposition from wealthier nations.82)
Last but not least, the OECD has two sets of rules, one set for its own member 
nations and one set for the rest of the world. The OECD‘s 2000 blacklist included 
41 jurisdictions,83 none of which were members of the Paris-based bureaucracy. 
Yet at least six OECD nations are tax havens, including the United States, Swit-
zerland, Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.84 Why are these 
nations – all of which are tax havens according to the OECD‘s criteria – not on 
the blacklist?
The Right Way to Reduce Tax Evasion
Opponents of tax havens do make one compelling argument. It is unfair, they say, 
for some people to avoid taxes while others are stuck carrying the load. For those 
who believe that the law should apply equally to all, this is an important issue. 
The key question, of course, is how this inequity should be solved. An attack on 
tax havens is probably not the answer. Simply stated, it is unlikely that the who-
lesale destruction of ﬁnancial privacy will have a positive effect since people will 
enter the underground economy. 
In Europe, the underground economy accounts for more than 16 percent of 
economic output. In some countries, such as Greece and Italy, more than one-
fourth of economic activity takes place underground.85 The biggest reason for the 
existence of the shadow economy, not surprisingly, is tax burden. As one of the 
world‘s leading experts on the underground economy has written: 
In almost all studies it has been found out, that the tax and social security con-
tribution burdens are one of the main causes for the existence of the shadow 
economy. ...Empirical results of the inﬂuence of the tax burden on the shadow 
economy ...all found statistically signiﬁcant evidence for the inﬂuence of ta-
xation on the shadow economy.86
78  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, „Improving Access to Bank Informa-
tion for Tax Purposes,“ Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Paris, 2000. Available at http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/3/7/2497487.pdf. 
79 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, „Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue,“ 1998. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf.
80 Devesh Kapur and John McHale, „Are We Losing the Global Race for Talent?“ Wall Street Jour-
nal, November 21, 2005. Available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113254107083002777.
html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep. 
81 United Nations, „Report of the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development,“ June 26, 2001. 
Available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/a55-1000.pdf.
82 For more information on the UN scheme, see Daniel J. Mitchell, „United Nations Seeks Global 
Tax
 Authority,“ Prosperitas, Vol. I, No. II (August 2001), at http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/
Papers/un-report/un-report.shtm. 
83  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, „Towards Global Tax Co-operation,“ 
2000. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf.
84 Daniel J. Mitchell, „The OECD‘s Anti-Tax Competition Campaign: An Update on the Paris-Based 
Bureaucracy‘s Hypocritical Effort to Prop Up Big Government,“ Prosperitas, Vol. 5, Issue 2, No-
vember, 2005. Available at http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/Papers/oecd-hypocrisy/oecd-
hypocrisy.shtml. 
85 Friedrich Schneider, „Shadow Economies around the world: What do we really know?“, European 
Journal of Political Economy, September 2005. Available at http://www.econ.jku.at/Schneider/
ShadEconomyWorld6_EJPE.pdf.
86 Friedrich Schneider, „Shadow Economies around the world: What do we really know?“, European 
Journal of Political Economy, September 2005. Available at http://www.econ.jku.at/Schneider/
ShadEconomyWorld6_EJPE.pdf. 
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In other words, if politicians succeed in taxing income that currently is pro-
tected in tax havens, the likely result is that some of this economic activity will 
shift to the underground economy. And since the weakening of tax competition 
would encourage politicians to impose higher tax rates, this will further accele-
rate the ﬂight of productive behavior to the black market. Interestingly, even the 
OECD seems to understand that high tax rates are the problem, writing, „[I]llegal 
tax evasion can be contained by better enforcement of tax codes. But the root 
of the problem appears in many cases to be high tax rates.“87 Another OECD pu-
blication notes, „...lowering statutory corporate tax rates and rates on personal 
capital income in countries where these are particularly high, may increase the 
domestic tax base as there are less incentives to shift taxable proﬁts and capital 
income abroad.“88
Indeed, that is the right way to ﬁght tax evasion. The answer, as some ofﬁcials 
at the OECD understand, is to cut tax rates and reform the tax system. The lower 
the tax rate, the lower the incentive to use either legal or illegal means to hide 
money. In other words, when tax rates are low, people are willing to report more 
income to the government. This is part of the reason why tax rate reductions of-
ten result in increased tax revenues. During the 1980s, for instance, upper-income 
taxpayers dramatically increased the amount of income they reported--and hence 
the amount of tax they paid when Ronald Reagan lowered the top tax rate from 
70 percent to 28 percent. The same thing happened following the Kennedy tax rate 
reductions in the 1960s. Revenues rose, and the rich wound up paying more.89
Similarly, lower tax rates and better tax systems have reduced the underground 
economy in the former Soviet Bloc. Russia‘s 13 percent ﬂat tax, for instance, has 
dramatically boosted compliance. Indeed, inﬂation-adjusted personal income 
tax receipts have jumped by more than 100 percent in just four years.90 Ireland‘s 
low-rate 12.5 percent corporate tax is generating similar results. Corporate tax 
revenues are approaching 4 percent of GDP, compared to less than 1.5 percent of 
GDP when the tax rate was 50 percent.91
This economic analysis of tax evasion also should be augmented by a review 
of the philosophical issues. There are instances where taxpayers no longer have 
a moral obligation to pay tax. Indeed, in the case of a genocidal government, pa-
ying taxes in those situations may be the wrong thing to do. As one scholar no-
ted, „one might ask whether Jews have an obligation to obey all the laws of the 
country, and to pay all the taxes they legally owe, if Hitler were the tax collector. 
...did the Mormons in nineteenth century New York State have an absolute ethi-
cal obligation to pay taxes to the very government that was running them out of 
the state, sometimes at gunpoint?“92
Tax compliance also may be morally questionable if government is acting ir-
responsibly. As one academic article noted, „Tax evasion restricts government‘s 
ability to act as a Leviathan by maximising the own preferences. Thus, tax evasi-
on might reduce the tax revenues and therefore the size of government. ...There 
seems to be a certain consensus that tax evasion is rather allowed when taxes 
are unfair, the government acts inappropriately or the government is not legiti-
mated.“93 Another scholars asks, „What if you live under a corrupt government, 
where a large portion of tax revenue goes to corrupt politicians and their friends 
and family? ...What if you are in a high tax bracket and the government takes 
more than 90 percent of your marginal income... If the government uses the tax 
system as a means of redistributing income rather than as a means of ﬁnancing 
legitimate government functions, are you justiﬁed in evading taxes?“94
Last but not least, some academics wonder whether tax compliance is ap-
propriate in corrupt nations. One academic article states, „Some governments in 
87  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Outlook, June 17, 1998. 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/2088806.pdf
88  Willi Leibfritz, John Thornton, and Alexandra Bibbee, „Taxation and Economic Performance,“ 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economics Department, Working 
Paper No. 176, 1997. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/25/1863834.pdf.
89  Daniel J. Mitchell, „The Correct Way to Measure the Revenue Impact of Changes in Tax Rates,“ 
Backgrounder 1544, The Heritage Foundation, May 3, 2002. Available at http://www.heritage.
org/Research/Taxes/BG1544.cfm. 
90  Alvin Rabushka, „The Flat Tax at Work in Russia: Year Four, 2004,“ The Russia Economy, January 
26, 2005. Available at http://www.russianeconomy.org/comments/012605.html. 
91 Eric Engen and Kevin Hassett, „Does the Corporate Tax Have a Future?“ Tax Notes, November 
8, 2002, at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20021222_raengehass0212.pdf.
92 McGee, Robert W., „The Ethics of Tax Evasion: A Survey of International Business Academics,“ 
60th International Atlantic Economic Conference, New York, October 6-9, 2005. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=803964 
93 Benno Torgler, „Tax Morale: Theory and Empirical Analysis of Tax Compliance,“ Dissertation, 
University of Basel, July 11, 2003. Available at http://pages.unibas.ch/diss/2003/DissB_6463.
pdf.  
94 McGee, Robert W., „The Ethics of Tax Evasion: A Survey of International Business Academics,“ 
60th International Atlantic Economic Conference, New York, October 6-9, 2005. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=803964 
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Eastern Europe, the CIS, Latin America and Asia could be labeled as corrupt, if not 
evil, because of the rampant bribery and suppression of individual rights. ...How 
evil or corrupt does a government have to be before tax evasion is no longer un-
ethical?“ The article also asks:
What if the government in question does not ruin many lives but merely makes 
life much more difﬁcult? What if the government ...conﬁscates the assets of its 
citizens without due process? ... what is a legitimate legislative authority? Hit-
ler and Mussolini both came to power via the democratic process. Many older 
Russians would eagerly elect Stalin if he were on the ballot. Many people in 
China would still vote for Mao even though he killed 30 or 40 million Chinese 
through a combination of brutality and stupid economic policies that caused 
millions to starve to death.95
It is not clear whether any of these questions have conclusive answers. But 
all of these issues illustrate that there is a relationship between the actions of a 
government and the morality of tax compliance. Presumably most people would 
agree that it is morally wrong to evade taxes in Hong Kong. The tax system is fair 
and simple and the government generally is honest. Yet most people also would 
agree that it is morally acceptable to evade taxes in a brutal dictatorship such as 
Cuba or Zimbabwe. 
In Democratic societies, tax evasion clearly is less acceptable. But some of the 
economic issues outlined above also are moral issues. Was it okay, for instance, 
to evade taxes in America when the top tax rate was more than 90 percent? And 
if it was morally acceptable, at what point did it become morally wrong? When 
Kennedy brought the top rate down to 70 percent? When Reagan lowered it to 
50 percent in the early 1980s? When he lowered it to 28 percent as part of the 
1986 Tax Reform Act?
The Phony Money Laundering Argument
Despite Hollywood stereotypes, so-called tax havens do not attract a signiﬁcant 
portion of the world‘s dirty money. But this statement is not based on the asserti-
ons of low-tax jurisdictions. Instead, it is based on the ratings of U.S. government 
agencies and international bureaucracies.96
The State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) each independently assess the extent to which a jurisdiction 
attracts – or has the potential to attract – dirty money. Some low-tax jurisdictions 
are on these lists, but they are clearly outnumbered by high-tax nations. Only 10 
tax havens – based on the OECD‘s 2000 blacklist97 – are on the State Department‘s 
list of problem jurisdictions, far less than the 46 non-tax haven jurisdictions that 
were placed on the list.98 The Central Intelligence Agency‘s blacklist is similarly 
tilted. Only three tax havens were named as problem jurisdictions, compared to 
13 non-tax haven nations.99 Rather remarkably, even the IRS has approved the 
anti-money laundering policies of 22 so-called tax havens – including every sin-
gle major offshore center.100
International bureaucracies also give tax havens a clean bill of health when 
compared to high-tax nations. No tax havens are on the Financial Action Task 
Force‘s money laundering blacklist.101 And more than three-fourths of all tax havens 
(including every signiﬁcant offshore center) are members of the Egmont Group, 
an association of anti-money laundering authorities limited to jurisdictions with 
effective laws and procedures for ﬁghting dirty money.102 Non-tax haven jurisdic-
tions cannot make this claim.
95 McGee, Robert W., „Is It Unethical to Evade Taxes in an Evil or Corrupt State? A Look at Jewish, 
Christian, Muslim, Mormon and Baha‘i Perspectives“. Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public 
Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 149-181, Winter 1999. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=251469 
96 Daniel J. Mitchell, „U.S. Government Agencies Conﬁrm that Low-Tax Jurisdictions Are Not Money 
Laundering Havens,“ Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 2003).
97 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, „Towards Global Tax Co-operation,“ 
June, 2000. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf.
98 U.S. Department of State, „International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,“ March, 2005. 
Available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol2/html/42388.htm. 
99 Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 
100  Internal Revenue Service, „List of Approved KYC Rules and Rules Awaiting Approval.“ Available 
at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/international/article/0,,id=96618,00.html#Approved. 
101 Available at http://www.fatf-gaﬁ.org/document/4/0,2340,en_32250379_32236992_33916420_
1_1_1_1,00.html. 
102 Available at http://www.egmontgroup.org/list_of_ﬁus.pdf. 
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Conclusion
Tax havens should be applauded, not persecuted. Their existence encourages go-
vernments to implement policies that boost growth and create opportunity. Tax 
havens play an especially key role in ﬁght against the double-taxation of saving 
and investment. These are the policies that genuinely improve the lives of ordinary 
people. Economic growth matters, both because of increases in living standards 
and because of the positive externalities associated with economic growth.
But faster growth is not the only reason to support tax havens. Low-tax juris-
dictions also help protect people from political, ethnic, and religious persecution. 
Tax havens provide a refuge for people living in nations dominated by corrupt 
and incompetent governments. People living comfortable lives in industrialized 
democracies sometimes forget that a majority of the world‘s population lives in 
nations that are not fully free. For these people, tax havens mean much more than 
merely a way to reduce ﬁscal burdens.
The anti-tax competition campaigns of international bureaucracies are based 
on bad economics and dubious morals. If high-tax nations want to reduce tax 
evasion, they should ﬁx their tax systems. Thanks to tax competition, this option 
is underway, but many politicians from high-tax governments – particularly in 
Europe – are ﬁghting to preserve their uncompetitive welfare states. But the nar-
row and selﬁsh agenda of these politicians should not be allowed to undermine 
the valuable role of tax havens in the global economy.
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